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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The theme of this Symposium has been default rules, and much of 
the focus has naturally been on contract law. The elephant in the 
room that has gone almost without mention is new formalism. The 
new formalists in contract law, who are best represented by Alan 
Schwartz and Robert Scott,1 argue that despite the conventional wis-
dom, there are in fact very few default rules in contract law.2 What 
typically pass for default rules are, for the most part, vague stan-
dards that do more harm than good. Moreover, they argue that the 
very idea of a universal set of default rules that would govern most 
contract situations is in principle a quixotic quest3 and in practice 
even worse due to institutional incompetence4 and the influence of 
interest groups.5 Since much of the scholarship in contract law over 
the last few decades—including some of the contributions to this 
                                                                                                                      
 ∗ Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. Special 
thanks to Barbara Chrisman, Larry Garvin, Richard Gerberding, John Goldberg, Greg 
Mitchell, and Bob Rasmussen for helpful discussions and comments on earlier drafts. 
 1. In fact, while much has been made about an alleged return to formalism or con-
ceptualism in the jurisprudence of contract, see, e.g., David Charny, The New Formalism in 
Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842 (1999); Robert A. Hillman, The “New Conservatism” in 
Contract Law and the Process of Legal Change, 40 B.C. L. REV. 879 (1999); Ralph James 
Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L. REV. 1131 (1995); Thomas C. 
Grey, The New Formalism (Stanford Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, 
Paper No. 4, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=200732, Schwartz and Scott are 
the only scholars I know of to give a systematic argument in favor of a return to formalism 
in contract law, and even they seldom use that term. 
 2. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract 
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003). 
 3. Id. at 594-609. 
 4. Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law, in THE 
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 149-92 (Jody S. 
Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000); Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the 
Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389, 416 (1993); Robert E. Scott, The 
Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847, 848 (2000) [hereinafter 
Scott, The Case for Formalism]. 
 5. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 
143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 610-11 (1995); Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, 62 
LA. L. REV. 1009, 1009-12 (2002).  
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Symposium—has centered on the quest for better default rules, if 
they are right, the very value of that work is in serious question. A 
symposium on default rules at this juncture would be incomplete if it 
did not mention this important charge. As it turns out, Eric Posner’s 
intriguing article on penalty default rules inadvertently sets the 
stage for such a discussion. 
 Posner’s focus is not new formalism; indeed, he only mentions it in 
passing. Instead, his article takes on a subset of the default rules 
scholarship, that dealing with penalty default rules. He argues that 
there are no penalty default rules in contract law,6 a claim that will 
no doubt come as quite a surprise to many. His arguments purport to 
show candidate by candidate how various rules are in fact not pen-
alty default rules after all, despite the influential work of Ian Ayres 
and Robert Gertner.7 In the end, Posner speculates as to why it 
would be the case that there are no penalty default rules and cites 
Schwartz and Scott’s recent article8 for the argument that there are 
virtually no default rules in contract law at all. He says in passing 
that if there are no default rules, then obviously there are no penalty 
default rules.9 This seeming truism is my starting point. My aim is 
not to deny Posner’s claim that there are no penalty default rules, 
but instead to show that new formalists like Scott and Schwartz are 
an unlikely source of support despite their rejection of the default 
rules project. I intend to show that the formalism they advocate is ac-
tually penalty-like in spirit, even though it is technically not the kind 
of penalty default rule about which Ayres and Posner disagree. Along 
the way I hope to explain better the relationship between formalism 
and default rules. 
 The term “default rules” is used in different ways. Sometimes it 
refers to any rule that can be contracted around by the parties to an 
agreement.10 Posner, on the other hand, uses the term in a more nar-
row way. For Posner, as well as Ayres and Gertner, default rules are 
rules that provide the terms needed to fill gaps in contracts.11 Pen-
alty default rules, roughly, are rules that fill those gaps with terms 
disfavored by most parties in order to force drafters to make their 
                                                                                                                      
 6. Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 563 (2006). 
 7. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). 
 8. Posner, supra note 6, at 587. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search 
of Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2005) (“We style as mandatory those rules 
that legal actors are obliged to obey, irrespective of their wishes upon the matter. . . . De-
fault rules, on the other hand, are freely breakable, applying only to a legal actor who for-
bears to take whatever steps the law requires to override them.”). 
 11. Posner, supra note 6, at 565-66, 568. 
2006]                          NEW FORMALISM 685 
 
agreements explicit, thus avoiding the unwanted terms.12 Ayres and 
Gertner argued that penalty default rules are preferable to majority 
rules in certain cases where one party has information another party 
does not have.13 Clearly, under these definitions Posner’s claim is 
true: if Scott and Schwartz are right that there are few or no rules 
that fill gaps in contracts, then there are few or no rules that fill gaps 
in contracts with disfavored terms. I do not dispute either this claim 
or Posner’s main thesis that there are no penalty default rules.  
 I do wish, however, to call into question two distinctions Posner 
makes along the way, both of which new formalism implicitly rejects. 
Posner distinguishes on the one hand between default rules and for-
malities of contract law and on the other hand between default rules 
and rules of contract interpretation. Although they do not discuss 
these distinctions directly, I will argue that Schwartz and Scott are 
implicitly committed to rules of interpretation that are both default 
rules14 and formalistic—indeed, that is the essence of their project. 
Moreover, while these formal default rules of interpretation are not 
technically penalty default rules as Ayres defines the concept (thus I 
will leave Posner’s thesis untouched), I will argue that they are more 
in the spirit of penalty default rules than Karl Llewellyn’s vision of 
default rules that inspired much of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(U.C.C.). More importantly, I will argue that as the confusion over 
these distinctions will make clear, before we can evaluate the new 
formalists’ arguments, we must give serious consideration to what 
formalism is and why we have it in contract law. 
 In Part I, I begin by discussing formalism, both the classical ver-
sion (though as we shall see it is far from clear just what classical 
formalism was) and Schwartz and Scott’s new formalism. I will then 
turn in Parts II and III to Posner’s two distinctions and show that 
each is implicitly rejected by new formalism. Part IV concludes by 
suggesting that the exercise of distancing new formalism from Pos-
ner’s specific arguments may teach us a lesson about how to evaluate 
new formalism.   
II.   CLASSICAL VERSUS NEW FORMALISM 
 Ideally, a discussion of new formalism would begin with an expla-
nation of classical formalism. Unfortunately, there is little agreement 
in the literature as to what formalism in the law is, much less what 
it is in contract law.15 The traditional definition is the familiar carica-
                                                                                                                      
 12. Id. at 571-72. 
 13. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 7, at 91-95. 
 14. At least in the broad sense of the term and arguably in the more narrow, gap-
filling sense as well. 
 15. There is, unfortunately, general agreement that the term is, or until recently was, 
used almost exclusively as a pejorative. See, e.g., BRIAN H. BIX, A DICTIONARY OF LEGAL 
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ture of classical formalism as “mechanical jurisprudence.”16 Because 
two of the early alleged purveyors of this jurisprudence were con-
tracts scholars—Christopher Columbus Langdell and Samuel Willis-
ton—mechanical jurisprudence is often associated with contract law 
in particular, though the relationship between classical formalism 
and contract law may go no deeper than the alleged common parent-
age.17 According to so-called mechanical jurisprudence, legal adjudi-
cation is a matter of logical deduction, of moving “mechanically or 
automatically from category or concept to conclusion, without consid-
eration of policy, morality, or practice.”18 This brand of formalism is 
often associated with transcendentalism; that is, it is often thought 
to be based on first principles or abstract truths, perhaps from natu-
ral law, that can be known a priori.19 
 The idea that anyone of note ever really believed in such an ex-
treme view is a myth that has now thankfully been largely debunked 
by careful thinkers.20 Today one finds a variety of proposed defini-
tions of formalism,21 most of which are in tension if not outright con-
                                                                                                                      
THEORY 69 (2004) (“The term [‘formalism’] is usually used in a pejorative sense . . . .”); 
ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 22 (1995) (“In contemporary academic dis-
cussion, ‘formalism’ is a term of opprobrium.”); Grey, supra note 1, at 1 (“It has long been 
an insult in sophisticated legal circles to call someone a formalist.”). 
 16. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 
35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 821 (1935); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. 
REV. 605 (1908).  
 17. The most prominent noncontract law classical formalist was Joseph Beale, who is 
known primarily for his work on conflict of laws. For an excellent discussion of classical 
formalism and misconceptions about it, see ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN 
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 48-112 (1998). 
 18. BIX, supra note 15, at 69. 
 19. See SEBOK, supra note 17, at 48-112. 
 20. Id. (arguing that formalism as understood by its realists critics was actually in-
vented by those same critics and was unfairly attributed to Langdell and Beale); Thomas 
C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 11-45 (1983) (arguing that classical 
legal orthodoxy, in particular that of Langdell, was not deductive or mechanical but rather 
inductive in the spirit of John Stuart Mill’s understanding of logic); Mark L. Movsesian, 
Rediscovering Williston, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207 (2005) (arguing that the typical un-
derstanding of Williston’s contracts theory as rigid and overly deductive fails to appreciate 
a strong pragmatic element in his work). 
 21. See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra note 15, at 24 (arguing that formalism is the view that the 
law is “rational,” “immanent,” and “normative,” and that each of these qualities are related 
such that the law has each “only insofar as it has the other two”); Larry Alexander, “With Me, 
It’s All er Nuthin’ ”: Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 530, 531 (1999) (“By 
formalism I mean adherence to a norm’s prescription without regard to the background rea-
sons the norm is meant to serve (even when the norm’s prescription fails to serve those back-
ground reasons in a particular case).”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 
UCLA L. REV. 621, 646 (1990) (“Formalism posits that judicial interpreters can and should be 
tightly constrained by the objectively determinable meaning of a statute . . . .”); Grey, supra 
note 20, at 8 (“A legal system is formal to the extent that its outcomes are dictated by demon-
strative (rationally compelling) reasoning.”); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 
509, 510 (1988) (“At the heart of the word ‘formalism,’ in many of its numerous uses, lies the 
concept of decisionmaking according to rule.”); Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1145-46 (1999) (reviewing SEBOK, supra note 17) (defining formal-
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flict with one another, and none of which really speak to the special 
role that formalities play in contract law. The most comprehensive 
examination of the relationship between formalism and contract law 
that I know of remains Lon Fuller’s well-known article Consideration 
and Form,22 itself now over sixty years old. 
 In that work, Fuller’s primary aim was to explain the considera-
tion doctrine. He argued that consideration was best understood as a 
formality, much like the requirement that certain kinds of contracts 
be in writing. To make his case, he discussed the function that legal 
formalities play in contract law. According to Fuller, formalities 
serve an evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling function.23 They 
provide evidence of the parties’ intention to enter into an agreement 
and thereby help to reduce fraud. They provide caution to parties 
about to enter into agreements, hopefully helping them to appreciate 
the gravity of entering a legally binding agreement. And they give le-
gal documents a clear mark of enforceability, thereby channeling 
agreements into a form suited for adjudication in a court of law.  Al-
though not by any means a thorough account of classical formalism, 
Fuller’s article remains the leading discussion of formalities in con-
tract law. 
 Whatever classical formalism is, in contract law or elsewhere, 
Schwartz and Scott’s version of new formalism in contract law is 
clear. It consists primarily of two main claims. First, they argue that 
courts and legislators should not try to write contracts ex ante by try-
ing to anticipate which rules parties would want in their contracts 
and making those rules default rules.24 Any attempt to come up with 
a single set of rules that could govern the vast array of transactions 
covered by such a broad net as the U.C.C. will inevitably be either 
prohibitively expensive, hopelessly vague, or both. It would be too 
expensive to come up with a list long enough to cover adequately the 
spectrum of possibilities in a large, heterogeneous economy. Thus, 
the U.C.C. contains a more manageable list of default “standards” 
rather than default rules, such as the warranty of “merchantabil-
ity.”25 If left to their own devices, rational parties would create their 
own terms, precise and specific to their own situation. As it is, they 
are left with vague standards that are at best useless, as they pro-
vide no guidance and, at worst, are ripe for exploitation by those who 
seek to get out of bad contracts opportunistically. Therefore, parties 
                                                                                                                      
ism as “the descriptive theory of adjudication” according to which the class of legal reasons 
justifies one and only one outcome to a legal dispute and judges have no discretion in adjudi-
cating cases).   
 22. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941). 
 23. Id. at 800-01. 
 24. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 594-609. 
 25. U.C.C. § 2-314 (2005). 
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must expend resources contracting around the unwanted default 
standards or else live with a heightened level of uncertainty. Worse 
yet, courts and legislatures are simply not the best drafters of default 
rules in the first place.26 
 Secondly, the new formalists argue that courts should also not try 
to rewrite contracts ex post by allowing lots of evidence during litiga-
tion about the meaning of contracts.27 Judges should be allowed to 
use only the text of the document and a standard, English dictionary 
when interpreting contract language, and they should reject at-
tempts to bring such evidence as trade customs or the parties’ prior 
dealings. Their reasoning is fairly simple: the more evidence that is 
brought in to litigate a dispute, the more expensive that process will 
be. Even if such a process would lead to more accuracy—and because 
of institutional inadequacy and the potential for opportunistic behav-
ior there is reason to doubt that it would—the increased accuracy 
comes at a price. Rational parties would generally not be willing to 
pay that price ex ante since the potential litigation costs would eat 
into the expected value of the contract as a whole. The more expen-
sive litigation process only becomes attractive ex post when one party 
realizes it is on the losing side of a contract and needs leverage in or-
der to obtain a better settlement. Therefore, parties would prefer ex 
ante (when they do not yet know if they will be winning or losing on 
the deal) that their agreements be interpreted using only the written 
contract itself—as Williston famously put it long ago,28 what is con-
tained within the four corners of the document. 
 Having introduced, however incompletely, the concepts of formal-
ism and new formalism, we are now in a position to return to Pos-
ner’s discussion of penalty default rules. In the course of arguing that 
there are no such things as penalty default rules, Posner makes two 
distinctions I argue are questionable at best. As we will see, rather 
than supporting his views, the new formalists actually serve as coun-
terexamples to his distinctions. 
III.   DISTINCTION 1: DEFAULT RULES AND CONTRACT FORMALITIES 
 One example Posner considers of an alleged penalty default rule 
offered by Ayres and Gertner is the “zero quantity rule.”29 Under the 
common law, contracts that did not include essential terms were un-
enforceable.30 The U.C.C., however, is not so shy about filling such 
gaps. Even terms as important as price can be left out, in which case 
                                                                                                                      
 26. See supra notes 4-5. 
 27. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 584-90. 
 28. SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 
633, at 1015 (4th ed. 1990). 
 29. Posner, supra note 6, at 575-76. 
 30. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 6.7, at 387-89 (4th ed. 2004). 
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the U.C.C. calls for courts to supply a “reasonable price.”31 However, 
if the parties fail to specify the quantity of goods sold, the contract 
will not be enforced even under the U.C.C.32 Ayers and Gertner in-
terpret this requirement as a rule that the courts are actually to 
supply a quantity term: zero.33 They then argue that this default rule 
is a penalty default, since clearly no one would contract for a zero 
quantity.34 If the parties wanted to buy or sell zero goods, they would 
not need a contract that said so.  
 Posner argues that the “zero quantity rule” really does not fit the 
Ayres and Gertner model since, rather than penalizing one party for 
the failure to reveal information to the other party, it penalizes both 
parties for the failure to reveal information to the courts.35 More in-
teresting, for my purposes, is his argument that the rule is not a de-
fault rule anyway but rather a contract formality, implying that the 
two categories are mutually exclusive.36 He gives three arguments in 
favor of the distinction. First, he argues that the organization of the 
U.C.C. suggests the framers intended the rule to be a formal re-
quirement (section 2-201 is entitled “Formal Requirements: Statute 
of Frauds”)37 while other default rules are more substantive.38 But 
with no real discussion in the U.C.C. of the distinction or its impor-
tance, it would be a mistake to place much weight on this argument, 
and Posner does not.  
 Secondly, he briefly mentions that while parties can (by defini-
tion) contract around default rules, they cannot opt out of contract 
formalities.39 However, while this is true of many formalities, it is not 
clear that it is true of all contract formalities. For example, not all 
modifications to a contract need be in writing, but the parties can re-
quire modifications to be in writing if they so desire.40 As comment 3 
to section 2-209 puts it, “Subsection [2-209](2) permits the parties in 
effect to make their own Statute of Frauds as regards any future 
modifications of the contract by giving effect to a clause in a signed 
agreement which expressly requires any modification to be by signed 
writing.”41 Similarly, section 2-206, which governs the formal re-
quirements for offer and acceptance, provides the default rule that of-
fers “shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by 
                                                                                                                      
 31. U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (2005). 
 32. Id. § 2-201(1) & cmt. 1. 
 33. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 7, at 96. 
 34. Id. at 97. 
 35. Posner, supra note 6, at 577. 
 36. Id. at 576-77. 
 37. U.C.C. § 2-201 (2005). 
 38. Posner, supra note 6, at 576-77. 
 39. Id. 
 40. U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (2005). 
 41. Id. § 2-209 cmt. 3. 
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any medium reasonable in the circumstances” unless the offer “un-
ambiguously” communicates that only a more limited manner of ac-
ceptance will suffice.42  So while it is true that most contract formali-
ties cannot be contracted around, parties do have some level of con-
trol over the degree of formality required for the course of perform-
ance of their contract. 
 Thirdly, and most interestingly, Posner claims that default rules 
are meant to fill gaps in contracts while the purpose of contract for-
malities is to prevent fraud.43 Although preventing fraud is one func-
tion contract formalities serve, it is arguably far from the entire 
story. In fact, formalities may also have much in common with de-
fault rules. Recall Lon Fuller’s claim that formalities serve three 
functions: evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling.44 The evidentiary 
function certainly helps to prevent fraud,45 but the cautionary and 
channeling functions are not primarily related to fraud. The caution-
ary function is meant to ensure that people appreciate the conse-
quences of the contracts they sign. And by channeling agreements, 
formalities serve to provide a public mark of legal rights and duties. 
Such marks also provide evidence, but not so much to prevent fraud 
between the two parties. Instead, such marks clarify legal obligations 
for the two parties, for the courts, and for interested third parties. 
 The channeling function is worth particular attention since it is 
related to the current debate about default rules. Fuller saw legal 
formalities as a way of channeling ordinary transactions into a legal 
medium.46 His analogy was the use of language: “One who wishes to 
communicate his thoughts to others must force the raw material of 
meaning into defined and recognizable channels; he must reduce the 
fleeting entities of wordless thought to the patterns of conventional 
speech.”47 Similarly with agreements, if one wishes to make an 
agreement legally enforceable, one must conform to legal formalities. 
Parties cannot merely agree; rather, they must channel their agree-
ment into a form suited for enforcement by the courts. This require-
ment also helps the parties, as well as third parties, to predict better 
how courts will adjudicate a dispute over the contract if one should 
arise.48 
                                                                                                                      
 42. Id. § 2-206(1)(a). 
 43. Posner, supra note 6, at 576-77. 
 44. Fuller, supra note 22, at 800-01. 
 45. It need not serve only that purpose. For example, a plaintiff may sincerely believe 
she and the promisor made a pact, when in fact the promisor sincerely believes they did 
not. Requiring the plaintiff to prove that the promisor objectively manifested assent helps 
to smoke out such misunderstandings. 
 46. Fuller, supra note 22, at 801-02. 
 47. Id. at 802. 
 48. Id. at 801. 
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 It was against a backdrop of such formalist thinking that Karl 
Llewellyn drafted the U.C.C.,49 including many of the default rules 
we know today. Llewellyn was opposed to excessive formalism in con-
tract law and saw formal requirements as getting in the way of busi-
ness.50 What contract law needed to do was be more responsive to 
business, not force business persons to “channel” their transactions 
into legal forms. The idea behind many of the U.C.C.’s provisions was 
to make contract law better reflect business practices.51 The formali-
ties were to be removed or, perhaps, made invisible by making them 
mimic business practices. Rather than building fences to channel 
business transactions down a legal path, Llewellyn wanted to build 
the fences around the already existing paths, which are (or at least 
were at that time) our best evidence of the most efficient rules of con-
tracting.52 Default rules fit this project well. To the extent that we 
can anticipate by what rules parties would want their transactions to 
be governed, we can ensure that their agreements can be legally en-
forceable even though they themselves are doing less formal con-
tracting rather than more. Most of the default rules scholarship (in-
cluding some of the contributions to this Symposium) is aimed at 
coming up with better legal rules so that the parties will not have to 
do much more to make their transactions legally enforceable than 
what they would do (or, for some theorists, what they rationally 
should do) already. The U.C.C. sought to move Mohamed to the 
mountain, rather than the mountain to Mohamed. 
 Penalty default rules, on the other hand, do not have this purpose. 
The idea is to have a legal rule the parties would not want in order to 
force them to take a legal step (like information disclosure) that they 
would not otherwise take. This is more akin to forcing a party to 
channel an ordinary practice into a legal practice, rather than seek-
ing to make legal rules conform to business practices. Therefore, in 
this more abstract sense, the absence of default rules would not nec-
essarily entail the absence of penalty default rules. Default rules and 
penalty default rules are structurally meant to do very different 
                                                                                                                      
 49. By the “U.C.C.” here, I primarily mean articles 1 and 2. Karl Llewellyn was the 
principle drafter of article 2, and although there were other influences, see WILLIAM 
TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 271 (1973), at the level of gener-
ality at which I speak in this Article, it makes sense to talk of Llewellyn as the drafter and 
to talk of article 2’s aims and Llewellyn’s aims interchangeably. 
 50. Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn’s Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 541, 559-60 (2000). 
 51. TWINING, supra note 49, at 369; Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liabil-
ity, and Discretionary Acceleration: Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 68 TEX. L. REV. 169, 170-71 (1989). 
 52. Alan Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn and the Origins of Contract Theory, in THE 
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW, supra note 4, at  
12, 14-17. 
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things—a conclusion that may help explain why, supposing Posner is 
correct, the U.C.C. contains no penalty default rules. 
 Recall new formalism. Both of Schwartz and Scott’s main claims—
the call to allow only a minimum of evidence to settle interpretation 
disputes and the rejection of default standards written by courts or 
legislators—are calls for formalism in that they insist that no matter 
what the moral obligations of the parties are or what a fair outcome 
or interpretation of the agreements would be, courts should only en-
force agreements that meet a rather strict writing requirement. But 
their arguments for these formalities are not the prevention of fraud 
(though there is some reference to deterring opportunistic behavior), 
but rather are that a higher degree of formality would maximize wel-
fare. The soundness of the arguments will apparently be determined 
by the empirical question of whether these measures really would 
maximize welfare, and not by the degree to which they uncover the 
precise intentions of the parties.53   
 When put in the context of Fuller’s three functions of contract 
formalities, the new formalists are primarily interested in the chan-
neling function. Ironically, that is the one function that Fuller 
claimed was underappreciated. For example, these arguments show 
little concern for the evidentiary function. In fact, it is part of their 
point that accuracy is expensive, and rational parties will not be will-
ing to pay for the most accurate interpretation possible.54 According 
to the new formalists, the whole point of contracting (at least for so-
phisticated firms) is to maximize joint surplus.55 They argue, in ef-
fect, that parties should be forced to channel their agreements into 
written documents that courts can easily and predictably interpret if 
they want the courts’ help in enforcing them, rather than relying on 
unwritten norms in the industry or vague default standards not ne-
gotiated or clarified by these parties.56 
 In sum, there is good reason to doubt Posner’s claim that there is 
a clear distinction between contract formalities and contract default 
rules. There is no a priori reason for thinking them distinct, and in-
deed, there are some formalities we are willing to give the parties a 
certain amount of control over. More importantly, his explanation for 
                                                                                                                      
 53. Scott, The Case for Formalism, supra note 4, at 875; see also Charny, supra note 1, 
at 850. 
 54. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 589 (“Business firms are content with interpre-
tations of their language that are correct on average, not always correct . . . .”); id. at 569 
(“Put another way, the issue is not what interpretive style is best calculated to yield the 
correct answer. Rather, the issue is what interpretive style would typical parties want 
courts to use when attempting to find the correct answer.”). 
 55. Id. at 549-56. 
 56. Ironically, Llewellyn shared virtually the same goals for contract, though he 
thought they could be better achieved through less formalism rather than more. See Alan 
Schwartz, supra note 52, at 14-15. 
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the distinction fails. Contract formalities arguably do much more 
than prevent fraud, and indeed, Schwartz and Scott argue that a 
highly formalistic system of contract is preferable not because of its 
ability to prevent fraud, but rather because its penalty-like channel-
ing function would maximize the expected gains of contracting.   
IV.   DISTINCTION 2: DEFAULT RULES AND RULES OF INTERPRETATION 
 We have seen that Posner responded to one Ayres and Gertner 
example of an alleged penalty default rule by drawing a distinction 
between default rules and contract formalities, a distinction I have 
called into question. Similarly, he meets another alleged example of a 
penalty default rule with another distinction. In response to Ayres’s 
claim that interpretive rules are in some cases penalty default rules, 
Posner draws a distinction between default rules and interpretive 
rules.57 Interpretive rules govern how we are to read vague or am-
biguous language, while default rules fill gaps. If there is a gap in the 
language with respect to that issue, then by definition there is noth-
ing to interpret. According to Posner, it is only when there is lan-
guage that needs to be interpreted that rules of interpretation come 
into play, and only when there is a gap in the language that default 
rules come into play.58 Therefore, interpretive rules and default rules 
are distinct. 
 For example, consider the new formalists’ proposed rule rejecting 
the U.C.C.’s course-of-dealing provisions.59 Schwartz and Scott would 
prefer a default rule60 whereby contracts are interpreted using only a 
bare minimum evidentiary base, such as a judge’s background and a 
standard, English dictionary.61 The U.C.C., by contrast, allows par-
ties to refer to a larger evidence base—for example, prior dealings be-
tween the parties and trade usage of those terms in the relevant in-
dustry—to interpret vague or ambiguous contract language. But by 
hypothesis the extra evidence is introduced in order to interpret ex-
isting language in the contract, not to fill in missing language. There-
                                                                                                                      
 57. Posner, supra note 6, at 579-81. 
 58. Id. at 579. 
 59. Posner, following Ayres, uses the example of the contra proferentem rule, Posner, 
supra note 6, at 579-81, but again, I am more interested in the relationship of new formal-
ism to Posner’s arguments. 
 60. Just to be clear, Schwartz and Scott are not opposed to all use of default rules. 
Rather, their complaint is that most of what we call default rules are really default stan-
dards. In most cases, the level of generality needed to cover most factual situations will re-
sult in a vague standard rather than a clear rule. However, in some cases, default rules 
can be successful. The interpretive rules for which they are calling serve as one example. 
Another is the rule that the breaching party must pay the nonbreaching party the differ-
ence between contract price and market price, but “[o]ther good default rules are hard to 
find.” Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 604 n.135. 
 61. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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fore, following Posner’s reasoning, the rule is a rule of interpretation 
and not a true default rule.  
 The distinction is problematic, though, and fortunately, even Pos-
ner calls it a “probably unimportant problem”62 with the idea that in-
terpretive rules are penalty default rules. As he notes, despite the al-
leged clean conceptual distinction between the categories, in practice 
the distinction does not hold in every case (even under the more nar-
row, gap-filling definition of default rules Posner is using).63 There 
could be, and indeed sometimes are, contractual clauses about how to 
interpret vague language in contracts. The U.C.C. even invites them, 
though they must be explicit in order to override the U.C.C.’s pre-
sumptions about interpretation.64 Arguably, when there are no such 
clauses, there is a gap—the contract is silent on an issue about which 
it could have spoken—and in that sense, interpretive rules are really 
default rules.65 Posner is probably right that since they are intended 
to be majoritarian rules they are still not penalty default rules that 
fit the Ayres and Gertner model, but his distinction between default 
rules and interpretive rules does not hold.66   
 More importantly, for our purposes, Schwartz and Scott are im-
plicitly committed to collapsing the distinction. Indeed, the whole 
goal of new formalism is to figure out the best rules of contract inter-
pretation. The new formalists do not argue that we should never al-
low extrinsic evidence to interpret contracts. If parties wish to in-
clude such evidence when their disputes are adjudicated, they can 
say so in the contract. What Schwartz and Scott want is a change in 
the default rules such that when parties do not tell us what rules of 
interpretation they prefer—that is, when they are silent on the issue, 
leaving a “gap” to be filled—we should use a Willistonian default 
rule. In short, Schwartz and Scott’s version of new formalism is a call 
for Willistonian default rules of interpretation. 
                                                                                                                      
 62. Posner, supra note 6, at 579. 
 63. Id. at 579-80. 
 64. U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 2 (2005) (“Unless carefully negated [course of dealing, course 
of performance, and usage of trade] have become an element of the meaning of the words 
used.”). 
 65. Similarly, in a new paper Richard Craswell argues that default remedies are best 
conceived of as “drafting requirements.”  Richard Craswell, Expectation Damages and Con-
tract Theory Revisited 7-8 (Apr. 15, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Flor-
ida State University Law Review).  Interestingly, for our purposes, at one point he calls 
them “drafting formalities.”  Id. at 8. 
 66. Ironically, if Schwartz and Scott are right, then the U.C.C.’s interpretive rules are 
not majoritarian. They still would not be in the spirit of penalty defaults, however, since 
they were clearly intended to be majoritarian. 
2006]                          NEW FORMALISM 695 
 
V.   CONCLUSION: HOW TO EVALUATE NEW FORMALISM 
 I began this Article by noting that Posner is mistaken to consider 
the new formalists like Schwartz and Scott fellow travelers. While 
his conclusion that there are no penalty default rules technically fol-
lows from their conclusion that there are no default rules, he 
achieves this result by means inconsistent with the spirit of their 
project. He relies on a distinction between default rules and contract 
formalities and a distinction between default rules and rules of con-
tract interpretation. By contrast, new formalism offers a theory of 
formalistic default rules of contract interpretation. Still, Posner re-
fers to the new formalists only in passing, and even the distinctions 
he makes are not crucial to his overall arguments. What purpose 
does this Article serve, then, other than to nip at the heels of Eric 
Posner? 
 One lesson to take forward is that we do not really have a very 
good idea of what formalism is. I mentioned above that recent at-
tempts to define formalism are in tension with one another and, in 
any event, do not address the potentially special role of formalities in 
contract law. Posner claims (in fairness, only in passing) that con-
tract formalities are only meant to deter fraud. By contrast, the new 
formalists seem to have little interest in fraud and instead, are en-
tirely focused on the channeling that formalities provide. Fuller men-
tioned both fraud and channeling, but his discussion of the latter was 
almost an afterthought. Additionally, he also emphasized the cau-
tionary aspect of legal formalities. It is surprising to see so little con-
sensus yet so little discussion of a topic as old as contract law itself. 
 It is telling that in recent work Schwartz and Scott do not call 
their view formalism, apparently deciding to follow Holmes’s advice 
not to attach a “fighting tag”67 to their work that might detract from 
the arguments themselves.68 But until we decide what formalism is, 
which doctrines are meant to be formal requirements, and why we 
have formal requirements in the first place, we will be unable to 
evaluate adequately the arguments for or against formalism, either 
the new or the classical version. Thus it is false to say, as is now 
sometimes said,69 that the success of new formalism will depend en-
tirely on the empirical question of whether it maximizes welfare. 
That claim is only true once other possible reasons for having for-
                                                                                                                      
 67. Patrick J. Kelley, A Critical Analysis of Holmes’s Theory of Contract, 75 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1681, 1684 n.10 (2000). 
 68. In earlier work, they embraced the term “formalism.” See Scott, The Case for For-
malism, supra note 4; Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, The Law and Economics of Costly 
Contracting, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 2, 3 (2004).  They do, however, in passing refer to their 
view as “Willistonian” even now and refer to “Willistonian formalism” in a footnote.  See 
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 569 n.53. 
 69.  Charny, supra note 1, at 850 (“Again, the issues here are fundamentally empirical.”). 
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malities are either eliminated or shown to reduce to welfare maximi-
zation. To their credit, this is not a question Schwartz and Scott beg. 
They do argue explicitly for an “efficiency theory of contract,”70 at 
least with respect to agreements among sophisticated firms, and 
hope thereby to settle all disputes of contract doctrine by appeal to 
welfare maximization.71 But they pay little attention, except by im-
plicit exclusion, to the other functions Fuller argued formalities per-
form or to the relationship between what he called their “formal” and 
“substantive” aspects.72 
 Ultimately, the more important question for new formalism may 
be whether rules of interpretation are distinct from formal require-
ments, not whether default rules are distinct from either formal re-
quirements or rules of interpretation. The rules of interpretation that 
Schwartz and Scott discuss certainly seem to be formal require-
ments, formalities intended to perform a channeling function at that. 
If that is right, then we must ask ourselves whether these formalities 
serve any other function before we can decide which rules of inter-
pretation we prefer. Along the way, we will also have to decide 
whether they are the sort of formalities we even want to allow par-
ties to contract around at all.73 Perhaps Schwartz and Scott’s argu-
ments can stand on their own without addressing larger debates 
about formalism, though if we avoid those issues we should probably 
not think of their view as a new version of classical formalism. But 
on the other hand, it may turn out that Schwartz and Scott cannot 
avoid debates about formalism just by eschewing the fighting tag. 
What we need first is both a better understanding and a re-
evaluation of classical formalism. Posner took on a recent fad in con-
tract law, one centered on penalty default rules. Before we can 
evaluate the latest, related rage—new formalism—we need a more 
careful treatment of many of the concepts and distinctions Posner 
mentions in passing. 
 
                                                                                                                      
 70. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 550-56. 
 71. Their view may or may not see the “social function” of contract law, like the “social 
function” of the market, as “subject to distributional and fairness constraints.” Id. at 549. 
 72. Fuller, supra note 22, at 799. 
 73. I have argued that Posner was incorrect to posit a per se rule that formalities 
cannot be contracted around. But at the other extreme, Schwartz and Scott suggest that if 
party preferences differ about a given rule, then that rule should be at most a default rule. 
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 569. (“Party preferences regarding judicial interpretive 
styles can differ. Therefore, interpretive styles should be defaults.”). The only explanation 
for making such rules mandatory, they argue, is an unjustified exercise of legal paternal-
ism. Id. at 609-18. This may be going too far as well, but this is not the time to evaluate 
those arguments.  
